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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

!

I

!
. !

COMMONWEALTH NATIONAL BANK, a
national banking association,

I

Plaintiff,
vs.
KENNEDY COMPANY, an unincorporated
association, CHARLES R. KENNEDY, JR.,
BLACK CORPORATION, WHITE PARTNERSHIP,
DOE ONE THROUGH DOE TEN, inclusive,
Defendants & Appellants.

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[ Case No.

THE KENNEDY COMPANY, a co-partnership, [ 12786

CHARLES R. KENNEDY; REBECCA KENNEDY,
his wife,
Cross-Complainants and
Appellants,
vs.
COMMONWEALTH NATIONAL BANK, a
national banking association, and
FIREMEN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Cross-Defendants and
Respondents.

[

[
[

[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[

-2BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to collect on a
note by the bank with cross-actions for
damages for wrongful dishonor of a check
drawn on the Commonwealth National Bank
by Charles R. Kennedy and Rebecca Z.

Kennedy, co-partners doing business as
The Kennedy Company, and for wrongful
garnishment of the Kennedy family bank
account in Salt Lake City, Utah
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendants stipulated to plaintiff's
note of $8,500 and interest.

The attorneys'

fees for plaintiff and cross-complaint
for defendants were tried by a jury.

-3-

Verdict for plaintiff of $ 2,000.00
attorneys' fees, and verdict against
cross-complainants on wrongful dishonor
of check, no cause of action.

The

refused to al low evidence or to consider
the wrongful garnishment claim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants and cross-complainants
seek reversal of the verdict and judgment
and the refusal to allow evidence to be
presented to the jury on the wrongful
garnishment claim, and a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The original action to collect a
note, interest and attorneys' fees (R 1-J
was commenced by Commonwealth National
Bank of San Francisco, ("Bank") against

-4Kennedy Company, an unincorporated
association Charles R. Kennedy and some
ficticious names.
Affidavit for garnishment filed
with the complaint was incomplete.

It

alleged" ... Defendants are about to dispose
of, conceal, or assign their property
held by Continental Bank and Trust
Company." (R 5)

Nothing is said about,

I

"to defraud creditors in the affidavit."
The affidavit was signed by a vice president of Commonwealth National Bank.
Writ of garnishment issued August
8, 1969, by the County Clerk, and was
served August 11, 1969 (R 6-7)

The

garnishment tied up the family checking
account in the names of Rebecca Z. or

-5-

Charles R

Kennedy of approximately

$20,000. ( 1004) without any notice
whatever.
Upon oral motion without notice,
Judge Stewart M. Hanson ordered the
garnishment be released August 14, 1969.
(R 8)

An order was signed December 5, 190

1

nunc pro tune as of August 14, 1969.
(R 58-59)

Plaintiff filed a motion September
11, 1969, to set aside release of garnish·
ment, for re-instatement of garnishment,
and for an order directing Kennedy to
replace the funds into the account at the
time of garnishment. (R 2f.1-21)

Objections

were filed to the motion (R 25-27) and
an affidavit of defendant Kennedy. (R 28-2c

..

-6-

Three affidavits from plaintiff Bank
officials were filed as support for the
motion.

These were affidavits:

1.

regarding an un-notarized
letter, clearly inadmissable
(R 31-32)

2.

Affidavit explaining error in
original affidavit (R 37-38)

3.

Affidavit stating that defendant
Kennedy had no· known assets in
California (R 39-41)

No facts were given to support a claim
that defendant Kennedy was going to try
to defraud creditors.

October 21, 1969

Judge Merrill C. Faux ordered a writ
garnishment to

issue (R 42).

of

The

garnishment did not catch any money.
There was a debit to defendanrs, Kennedy,
account October 21, 1969 of $549.62. (R 1005)

-7The order was filed and signed November
25, 1969 (R 60) and provided, "It is

hereby ordered that the release of
garnishment be set aside and writ of
garnishment reinstated."
Plaintiff, November 12, 1969 (R 50
filed a second motion to compel defendu
Kennedy to replace the funds freed when
the first garnishment was released.

motion was argued November 25, 1969 after
the Continental Bank branch manager and
vice president testified that
account showed a debit of $549.62
October 21, 1969.

The Judge gave an

order in Court that defendant, Charles
R. Kennedy replace $11,000 in the bank
account subject to the garnishment by

-8-

December 2, 1969.

The order was signed

and filed December 23, 1969 (R 66-67).
Plaintiff Bank, December 17,
filed a motion without any supporting
affidavit for an order to show cause why
defendant, Charles R. Kennedy, should not
be held in contempt for failure to replace the $11,000.

The order to show

cause was issued December 15, 1969 by Judge
Merrill C. Faux. (R 63-64)

Motion to

quash (R 72) and affidavits of defendant
Kennedy (R 73-74) and of others (R75-82)
were filed.

Argument was given on failure

to comply with Statute 78-32-3 UCA and
Bott vs. Bott, 20 U 2d 329, and failure
to file and serve a written order.

-9-

January 15, 1970 (R 83) the
following order was entered and filed:
"Defendant Charles R. Kennedy
appearing before the Honorable
Merrill C. Faux, one of the
judges of the above entitled
court, on January 7, 1970,
upon an Order to Show Cause
why he should not be held in
contempt for failure to replace
$11,000 of the funds withdrawn
from his garnished bank account
at Continental Bank as ordered
by this court on November 25,
1969, and the court finding
that Charles R. Kennedy has
sufficient assets to comply
with said order,
It is hereby Ordered that
Charles R. Kennedy replace
$11,000 withdrawn from his
garnished bank account at
Continental Bank by February
2, 1970, and that upon
failure to comply with this
Order, Charles R. Kennedy

-10appear before this court
on February 2, 1970, at
9:00 a.m.
Dated this 15th day of
January, 1970.
BY THE COURT

Is/ Merrill C. Faux

II

It was from this order "petition to
grant an appeal" was filed with the Supreme
Court. (R 87-94)

This appeal was not

granted when plaintiff agreed not to press
any garnishment until after judgment.
November 24, 1970, Defendant Kennedy
requested interrogatories relating to
the information within plaintiff's
knowledge supporting plaintiff's affidavit
that Kennedy was going to defraud creditors.
(R 145-147)

-11Judge Marcellus K. Snow sustained
plaintiff's objections on basis that
the question of wrongful garnishment had
already been adjudicated in favor of
plaintiff. (R 148 & 151)

Petition to

grant an appeal, January 21, 1971,
(R 166-176) was declined.
At the commencement of the trial
November 22, 1971, Judge Bryant H. Croft..
refused to consider the question of
wrongful attachment and held the
was

Judicata ,
The judgment rendered on the

complaint is not :in issue except for
attorneys' fees.

The claim of cross-

complainants for wrongful dishonor of a
check, arises when the Commonwealth

-12Bank returned a check drawn on the bank
by the Kennedy Company for $5,000.00,
payable to the order of Mr. Robert
McCluskey.

It is undisputed that there

were sufficient funds in the account at
all times to pay the check.

The account

balance was $9,617.64 at the beginning,
and at the end of May was $15,682.88.
The balance of the account did not get
be 1 OW $ 7 , 17 7 .

(R 3 9 7)

The check was on a form printed by
The Kennedy Company (Exhibit 3).

It was

dated May 6, 1968, payable to the order
of Mr. Robert McCluskey, Hamilton Montana,
for $5,000.00.

It was drafted upon

Commonwealth National Bank, San Francisco,
California.

It was encoded on tre bottom

-13"1210-0097" in magnetic ink.

That is

the number assigned by the Feder a 1 Reser
System to the Bank.

(R 425)

Also encode

on the bottom of the check was the numbe.

"597".

That is the number assigned by

United California Bank, whose computer I
used to process checks, to the Bank. (R41
Also encoded in magnetic ink on the bott
of the check is the number "301271".
That number is the number assigned by th:
Bank to the Kennedy Company account.

Th:

transit number for Commonwealth National
(R 628)

Bank is "11-97".
the signature of
(R 398)

0

Rebecca

The check bon

z.

Kennedy"

When the account was opened by

Mr. and Mrs. Kennedy, Mrs. Kennedy's
signature on that account, according to

-14-

the signature card, was "R.Z. Kennedy 11
(R 427)

However, her full name and

signature was known to the Bank, and
Charles Kennedy has arranged with the
Bank through the President, Daniel White,
to honor all checks on that account,
whether signed "R. Z. Kennedy 1 ' or
"Rebecca Z. Kennedy". (R 627)

'

The check

contained, however, a handstamped number
of another bank, "93-58", which had been
assigned to the First National Bank in
Bozeman, Montana.

Nevertheless, the

check promtly reached the Bank where it
was presented for payment.

(R 625)

Miss Irene Rosa testified the check was
dishonored because (a) it had been sent
to the wrong bank--it was not drawn on

-15-

the Commonwealth National Bank; (b) the
signature was irregular, and (c) the
account was really named The Kennedy
Company Enterprises, not The Kennedy
Company.

Cross-defendants then attempted

to introduce into evidence a check
similar in all respects to the check in
issue signed by "R.Z. Kennedy", which the
Bank honored in August, 1968, to prove
that the check in question could not have
been properly dishonored for the reasons
given.

The court refused to admit that

into evidence.

(R 638-639)

It is

inconceivable that the jury could have
found "no cause of action" had it been
informed of the existence of a similar
check which arrived at the Bank during

-16-

the critical period before Mr. Kennedy
discovered that his check had been dishonored_

Refusal to admit such a check

constitutes prejudicial error.
The court refused to permit that
portion of the testimony of Daniel White,
President of the Bank, to be read to the
jury whenever he testified that the check
in question was dishonored by mistake.
Mr. White's deposition was noticed
to be taken in behalf of the Bank.

On

the day before the deposition was scheduled,
the Bank attempted to call off the despositi1
but cross-complainants would not consent
and therefore his deposition was taken.
Mr. White testified that he was familiar
with both signatures of Rebecca Kennedy,

-17-

and that Charles Kennedy has arranged for
both of them to be honored by the Bank

on

all Kennedy accounts, regardless of what
the signature cards contained; that he to\
all officers of the Bank that no Kennedy
check was to be returned without payment,
but should be referred to him; that somehow the check in issue had not been referred to him, in disregard of his orders,
and the practice of the Bank.
was then asked:

Mr. White

"Do you know of any

reason why this check would have been
returned by the Commonwealth National
Bank?"

Objection to the question was

sustained, although that is practically
the same question cross-defendant asked
of his own witness, Irene Rosa.

The

-18-

answer stricken declare:

"No.

it back as we apparently did.
internal mistake. 11

(R 628)

We sent
It was an

Clearly,

Mr. White was entitled to answer that
question with a "yes" or "no".

But the

court did not permit him even to do that.
Furthermore, he was entitled to explain
his answer, but he wasn't permitted to
do that.

It is axiomatic that the pres-

ident of the Bank is the most qualified
man to know whether an item should have
been paid or dishonored, and whether such
dishonor was mistaken or malicious.

No

additional qualification of such a witness
on an internal banking matter is required.
The failure of the court to permit him
to so testify is prejudicial error.

Had

-19the jurors been allowed to hear his testimony, it is difficult to see how they
would have returned a verdict of no cause
of action.
Miss Rosa testified "We typed on
the check 'Item not drawn on 11-97'".
(R 437)

Later she testified when the

check was received "Item not drawn on

11-97 11 was already on the check, and in
her opinion this raised a question as to
whether the check should be paid.

When

Mr. White was asked the same question:
"Do you known how that got on the check? 11 1
he answered,
there.

11

I cou ldn' t say how it got

. . I just wouldn't know."

Question:

11

Y0ur opinion would be that it

was erroneous ?'i

Answer:

11

Yes. n

The

-20-

last question and answer were stricken.
( 629)

Although the question was leading,

that particular objection had been waived
when his deposition was taken.

Therefore,

there was no reason not to allow the
President of the Bank to testify to the
same matters to which Miss Rosa was called
upon to testify for the Bank.
Mr. White was then shown a communication which was mailed by the Bank to The
Kennedy Company (not to the Kennedy
Company Enterprises) which stated:

"on

this date we charged your account with
the unpaid item described below:

Drawn

by The Kennedy Company, Drawn on 93-58."
Reason for non-payment is incorrect ABA
number.

Mr. White was then asked if that

-21was a correct reason for failing to honor
the check.

Mr. White answered:

"Well,

I wou ldn' t say it is correct because there
is enough identification on the check to
pay, and the stamp and the name of the
bank and clearing house number down
here (indicating)."

(R 627-628)

The

court struck the answer and told the jury
to disregard it, although plainly his
testimony on the point was at least as
competent as Miss Rosa's and should have
been admitted.
The court (R 832) prejudicially
erred in refusing to permit Mr. Tanner
to testify as to when Mrs. McCluskey
learned that Kennedy's check has been
dishonored.

-22On the question of damages, one of
the key issues was the loss of the McCluskey
account.

Mrs. McCluskey testified in her

deposition taken by the Bank that she
became disenchanted with Mr. Kennedy at
the end of May, 1968, but that she didn't
learn the check had been dishonored until
June 20, 1968.

The Bank then claimed that

the loss of the McCluskey account was not
caused by the dishonored check.

Cross-

complainants offered to prove by Mr.
Tanner's testimony that Mrs. McCluskey
in a conversation on May 25, 1968, with
Mr. Tanner said she was disappointed or
disillusioned with Mr. Kennedy because
his check hadn't cleared.

(R 793)· This

testimony was offered to prove that Mrs.

-23McCluskey must have known at lea.st as
early as May 25, that the Kennedy check
drawn on the Bank had been dishonored on
or about May 22, 1968, and that her chang1
of attitude toward Mr. Kennedy was direct
related to the Bank's wrongful dishonor.
The trial court refused to admit such
testimony, on the ground that since cross·
complainants had offered Mrs. McCluskey's
deposition into evidence, they could not
impeach her.

This ruling is contrary to

Rule 26 (f) which provides in part that:
"At the trial or hearing any party may
rebut any relevant evidence contained in
a deposition whether introduced by him
or any other party".

The ruling was

extremely prejudicial, as the loss of

-24-

McCluskey account was a substantial portion of the total damages claimed by
cross-complainants.
The rulings of the Judge before
the jury herein reviewed, and the oral
examination of attorney Kent S. Lewis by
the Judge to aid Lewis in proving attorneys
fees before the jury (R 917-920) all had
a prejudicial effect upon the jury towards cross-complainants.

This prejudicial

attitude of the trial Judge is also portrayed in the summary given by the Court
(R 710-721) and the motion for a mis-trial
by Mr. Bayles.(R 729-731)

-25POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAL
I.

Order of Judge Merrill C. Faux:
a.
for a new garnishment, and
without supporting evidence was error;
b.
that defendant and crosscomplainant Charles R. Kennedy replace
$11,000.00 in garnishment was error;
c.
the continual threat of
contempt against Charles R. Kennedy was
error.
Rule 64 D (a), (b) (1), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure provides for abuse of
the constitutional rights of "Due Process".
It permits an injunction without hearing
to prevent an individual to use his own
bank account.

This in commercial life

today ruins the individuals credit and
gradually chokes the life blood out of
commerical trade.

It permits the clerk

of the court to issue the unconstitutional

-26injunction,
tying-up funds (by name of
I
garnishment) in a manner that is stronger
than an injunction issued by a judge.
Rule 65 A (b) provides temporary restraining order or injunction issued by a judge
of the court without notice may be set
aside without notice.

Why should the

clerk of the court be given stronger
authority for injunctive purposes without
notice than a judge?
The right to be heard is worthless
without notice, Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Due process requires an opportunity to be
heard, Grannis v.
(1950).

234 U.S. 385

-27Prejudgment seizure of property
under Wisconsin's prejudgment proceedure
was held unconstitutional because it
deprived a wage earner of the enjoyment
of earned wages without an opportunity to
hear, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of

Ba.y View, 395 U.S. 337 ( 1969).

The

Sniadach rule applied to a bank account,
Larson v. Fetherstan, 44 Wis. 2d 712,
172 N. W. 2d 20 (1969).

Prejudgment Summar1

proceedings cannot be applied to recovery
of household furniture under the Sniadach
rule, Laprease v. Ramours Furniture
inc., 315 F.Supp. 716 (1970). Prejudgment
taking of property is in violation of the
Constitution of Utah Article 1, Section
7,

This section provides that no persom

shall be deprived of life,

-28-

liberty or property, without due process
of law.
A defendant's denial of having
taken any action to defraud creditors in
any manner and denial of any intent to
defraud creditors placed the plaintiff's
second affidavit of claim of fraud or
intended fraud at issue, which the Court
refused to consider in accordance with
due process of law.

Godbe-Pitts Drug

vs. Allen, 8 U 117, 29 P 881; Desert
National Bank v. Little, Roundy & Co.,
13 U 265, 44 P 930; Western Auto Co., v.
Gurnea, 73 U 404, 274 P 863.
The Order to Show Cause issued in
this case against defendant did not give
the court any jurisdiction and was void

-29because it did not comply with the statute

UCA 1953, Sec. 78-32-3; In re Schulder,
221 P. 565, 62 U, 591; Bott v. Bott,
20 U 2d 329, 437 P2d 684.
II.

The trial court erred in its pro-

cedure before the jury as follows:
a. refusal to admit in evidence
a check honored by the bank similar to
the one in issue on the question of wrong·
ful dishonor.
b. refusal to permit that portion
of the testimony of Danie 1 White, Presiden:
of the Bank, to be read to the jury that
the check in question was dishonored by
mistake.
c. refusal to permit Bernard M.
Tanner to testify as to when Mrs. McCluske1
learned Kennedy's check had been dishonore(
This ruling is contrary to URCP
Rule 26 (f) which provides "At the trial
or hearing any party may rebut any relevant

-30-

evidence contained in a deposition whether
introduced by him or any other parti'.
The ruling prevented cross-complainants
from showing that the disturbance with
the McCluskey people arose after the
dishonor of the check was known by
Mrs. McCluskey in a.s far as the McCluskey
deposition which cross-complainants read
into evidence.
d. Cross-complainants were entitled
to recover for injury to reputation and
impairment of health.
On the precedent of Loucks v.
Alburquerque Nat. Ba.nk, 418 P2d 191 (NM},
the court refused to submit to the jury
the question of damages to cross-complainant's
reputation and health proximately ca.used
by the bank's wrongful dishonor, a.nd
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they as individuals are and remain the
"customers" of the Bank under Sec. 4402
of the Commercial Code of California.
This conclusion is strengthened by reference to California Corporation Code,
Sec. 15006, which provides in part that:
"A partnership is an association of two
or more persons to carry on as co-owners
a business for profit."

The foregoing

comes from the Uniform Partnership Act,
likewise adopted in Utah (Utah Code 481-3).

"Customer"

'

as used in Commercial

Code Sec. 4402, means "any person having
an account with a bank."

This definition

is broad enough to include the individual
partners, and the holding in Loucks;
(supra) to the contrary should be rejected.

-33On the question of damages, Sec.

4402 of the Commercial Code provides as
follows:

"A payor bank is liable to its

customer for damages proximately caused
by the wrongful dishonor of an item.
Where the dishonor occurs through mistake
liability is limited to actual damages
proved."
In construing this identical language, the Supreme Court of Indiana, in
American Fletcher Nat. Bank & Trust Co.
v. Flick, 252 N.E. 2d 839, said at p.
845:

Suffice it to say, that
insofar as the fact before
us require construction of
Burns § 19-4-402, we construe
it to permit recovery of
monetary compensation for
any actual or consequential

-34harm, loss or injury
proximately caused by a
wrongful dishonor. See
Loucks v. Albuquerque
National Bank (1966), 76
N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191.
We believe in this respect
that lables such as 'actual'
or 'consequential' are less
than meaningful in the
sense of the compensability
of harm, injury or loss
proximately caused by wrongful dishonor.
In Weaver v. Bank of America, 59
Cal 2d 428, 380 P2 644, the wrongful
dishonor section of the Civil Code (sec.
3320) read as follows:
No bank shall be liable to
a depositor because of the
nonpayment through mistake
or error, and without malice,
of a check which should have
been paid unless the depositor
shall allege and prove actual

-35damage by reason of such
nonpayment and in such
event the liability shall
not exceed the amount of
damage so proved.
In holding that section premitted
a cause of action to be stated in tort or
contract, and that damages for loss of
reputation and impairment to health are
recoverable under that section, the court
said at pp. 436-48:
Section 3320, enacted two
years after Hartford, emanated
from a uniform law drafted
by the American Bankers Association and was incorporated
in the law of seventeen states.
The Association issued a
statement justifying the
statute upon the ground
that plaintiffs suffered
little or no damage in the
majority of instances in
which the common law presumed

-36substantial damages,
that banks thus were
'mulcted in damages'
of proportion to the
inflicted.

and
being
out
injury

Assuming the purpose of the statute
to be the repeal of the commonlaw presumption of damages, such
purpose would not be thwarted
by recognition of compensatory
damages for actual loss of
reputation and impairment of
heal th. . .
The purpose of the common
law presumption was to permit substantial recovery
although specific damages
could not be shown due to
the difficulty of proof.
If a concomitant amelioration of the standards of
specificity and proof does
not accompany the repeal of
the presumption, a statute
designed to prevent injustice
to banks will be carried
beyond the point necessary

-37to that end; it will,
instead, inflict injustice upon the
depositor. . .
In brief, we see no
reason for according to
an institution so basic
to the contemporary society
as a bank a special nonstatutory exemption from
general tort liability.
Such immunity would necessarily rest upon the
outmoded concept that the
chain of causation would
break in this case because
of the intervening, but
foreseeable, act of a
third party. We can no
more adopt that unrealistic
approach than we can grant
the bank exoneration upon
the similarly contrived
ground that injury to
reputation and impairment
of health did not, within
the meaning of section 3320
of the Civil Code, inflict
'actual damage' upon plaintiff.
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Present Sec. 4402 is a watereddown version of former Sec. 3320.

Since

injury to reputation and impairment of
health were recoverable under Sec. 3320,
a fortiori, they are recoverable under
Sec. 4402, which allows the recovery of
all "damages proximately caused".
e. The court's instructions were
prejudicially erroneous.
Instruction No. 8 reiterates the
court's improper ruling that only The
Kennedy Company is entitled to claim
damages on the counterclaim.
Instruction No. 10 implies the
signature card controls withdrawals, any
agreement with the Bank to the contrary
notwithstanding.

That is not the law.

-39-

Any rule or regulation may be modified by
agreement between the parties, and it is
the agreement which controls.
Code Sec. 4103 (1))

(Commercial

In the case at bar

the evidence was uncontradicted that, by
agreement with the Bank, Rebecca

z.

Kennedy, of whom the Bank had a facsimile
signature on hand, was an authorized
signature on the account.
f.

The trial was basically unfair.

In addition to the foregoin prejudicial error, the court displayed
considerable animus toward Kennedy, and
advised him that his relationship with
the McCluskey's was offensive to the
Court.
g. The court showed favoritism
to plaintiff and cross-defendants in its
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examination of attorney Kent S. Lewis
aiding him his testimony of attorney's
fees.
CONCLUSIONS
In view of all of the foregoing,
we respectfully submit that the judgment
and all proceedings should be set aside
and a complete new trial be ordered to
hear questions of wrongful garnishment,
wrongful dishonor, all damages, and
attorney's fees.
Respectfully submitted,
Weston L. Bayles
of Davis and Bayles
and
Sidney DeGoff
of Field, DeGoff, Huppert
and MacGowan
Attorneys for Appellants

